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El Magreb se está convirtiendo en una zona cada vez más importante en la relación
transatlántica por dos razones fundamentales: primero , porque para la UE, los acontecimientos
que se producen en el norte de África tienen repercusiones en el sur de Europa, por lo que los
países a los que afecta (especialmente España, Francia e Italia) están presionando para
desarrollar una nueva y mejor relación económica, social y política con el Magreb y esto
influye en la relación transatlántica. Segundo, porque después de la Guerra Fría, el
Mediterráneo en general ha adquirido un carácter relevante internacionalmente. El hecho de que
se hayan creado más iniciativas políticas, económicas y militares por parte de la UE y EE.UU.
para mejorar la relación con el Magreb lo prueba.
Este interés por parte de la UE y de EE.UU. parece haber dado lugar a un reparto de
tareas respecto a la región del Magreb. Siendo la UE la que se enfrente a temas como la
inmigración y las relaciones culturales y económicas, y EE.UU. tratando otros temas como el
terrorismo, la proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva, etc. Este trabajo de investigación
trata de establecer la relevancia de esta región dentro de la relación transatlántica y por qué es
importante para EE.UU. y la UE.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Maghreb region becoming more important to the Transatlantic relationship for
two main reasons : first, because since the end of the Cold War, the Mediterranean region in
general has started to become a crucial region on the international scene. The fact that there are
more economic, political, and military initiatives from the European Union (EU) and the United
States (US) to create a better relationship with the Southern Mediterranean countries, proves
this. The second reason is that for the EU, the events that take place in the North of Africa have
repercussions in Southern Europe. Southern European countries, especially Spain, France, Italy
and Portugal are pressing to develop a new and better economic, social, and political
relationship with these countries, and this has an influence in the Transatlantic relationship.
This interest on the part of the EU and also of the US seems to have created a sharing
of tasks between both. The EU tries to address issues in the political, social and economic areas .
The US cooperates more in the military and security issues of the region, though the economic
relationsh ip between the US and the Maghreb countries is growing and there are also American
organizations such as The Peace Corps and USAID implementing social, economic, and
political programs.
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2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION
The study of the Maghreb region is not possible without first mentioning the
importance that the Mediterranean in general has been acquiring over the last years. During
both World Wars , the Mediterranean was an area used for military operations, and during the
Cold War it was a confrontational zone between the US and the Soviet Union, though it had a
secondary importance compared with Central Europe and the borders with the Soviet Union
(Morales 49-53). The Mediterranean area that could be threatened by the Soviet Union was
protected by bilateral defense relationships between the US and the bordering countries like
Italy, Spain, Turkey. With those agreements, the US was able to establish a military naval and
air presence. On the other hand, the Maghreb countries, during the 50s and 60s, went through a
decolonization period that produced sorne tension with the European countries, especiaIly
France , because they had nationalistic claims (Lesser 5-7). AIthough there have been periods of
tension between the Maghreb countries and the colonizer European countries, Tunisia and
especiaIly Morocco had always been closer to the Western countries during the Cold War than
AIgeria, which had an anti-imperialistic and pro-revolutionary ideology, and which was closer
to the Soviet Union. AIgeria received economic and military assistanee from the Soviet Union
until the 80s. Later, AIgeria became closer to Franee and the US, due to eeonomic reasons and
to end its international isolation, sinee the Soviet Union was then unable to provide assistanee
to the country (AIgeria 1993).
With the disappearanee of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the
Mediterranean beeame more important, espeeiaIly during the Gulf War, when Iraq invaded
Kuwait in August 1990. One of the eonsequences of that war was the strategie importanee of
the Mediterranean, because it was used as a logistical support zone for military operations in the
Gulf. AIso, the traditional idea of the Mediterranean as a zone separated from the Middle East
ehanged, espeeiaIly for the USo Today, analysts and policy makers see a greater conneetion
between the Mediterranean and the Middle East for air power (Lesser 1-4).
Other reasons why the Mediterranean has reeeived international atten tion have been
the disagreement between Moroeeo and Algeria over Western Sahara, Turkey's and Greece's
dispute over Cyprus , and the war in the Balkans .
2.1. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MA HGREB FOR THE EU
AIthough there is an offieial EU poliey towards the Maghreb and the Mediterranean,
we eannot forget that not aIl EU members have the same interests in the region. Southern
European countries have speeial interests due to geographieal proximity. We eannot say either
that the EU's CFSP (Common Foreign and Seeurity Poliey) is only one and that there are not
different polieies in the EU regarding the Mediterranean and other regions.
However, sinee what happens in the Mediterranean has an influenee in European
securi ty, the Mediterranean region, the South and the East of the Mediterranean, and the Middle
East are identified "as a key external relations priority for the EU" (The EU's Mediterranean
and Middle East.. . 2002) beeause the uItimate objeetive of the EU is the stability and the
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security of these regions . The Maghreb has serious problems such as tremendous population
growth, economic instability, and AIgeria particularIy suffers from political violence, terrorism ,
and radical Islamic groups. There is a confrontation between Morocco and AIgeria over
Westem Sahara, and aIl these problems can have consequences for the European countries,
especiaIly for Southern European countries, which fear massive imrnigration, discontinuation of
the energy supplies from AIgeria, terrorist attacks, the spiIlover of political violence, and
terrorism among others.
EconomicaIly, the Maghreb is also important for the EU, since AIgeria exports 62,7%
of its products to the EU, and the EU supplies 58% of AIgeria's imports (The EU 's Relations
with AIgeria, 2001) . Morocco gets more than half of its imports from the EU and it export s
three quarters of its exports to the EU (The EU's Relations with Morocco, 2002) . AIso, 80% of
Tunisian exports go to the EU, and the EU provides 71% of Tunisian imports (The EU's
ReIations with Tunisia, 2001).
In concIusion for the EU, the most important interests in the Maghreb are stability, the
continuity ofthe energy supply , and trade and investment.
2.2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MA GHREB FOR THE US
Although the Maghreb is not as important for the US as it is for the EU, the US wants
to maintain a good relationship with these countries because they can help to preserve US
interests in the Middle East, which mainly are access to oil and Israel's security. Stability in the
region is important, in arder to provide logistical support for the American naval control of the
Mediterranean, and support for the Middle East peace process. AIgeria is especiaIly important
because radical AIgerian Islamic groups could influence other groups in neighboring countr ies.
These groups could also negatively influence the good relationship the US has with Morocco
and Tunisia, and try to underrnine sorne military, political and economic bilateral agreements
between the US and those two countries (Quandt 10- I 1). AIso, after the terrorist attacks of
September 11lh 2001, the US wants the support of these countries in the international coalition
against terroris mo Morocco has been an especiaIly important " . . .strategic aIly for the Western
countries at first during the Cold War as an anticommunist force and more recently as a support
against Islamic militancy" (Zunes). Its strategic geographical situation can rnake it a gateway to
Africa and the Arab worId. That is why after Egypt, Morocco is the country that receives the
most military and economic assistance from the USoIts constant support of the peace process
in the Middle East makes it an indispensable aIly, and this is proven by the many visits by US
governrnent envoys to Morocco to find out the government's opinions and ensure support in the
confl ict (Zunes 2-4). On the other hand, Morocco has been active internationaIly--the King of
Morocco is the President of the Al-Quds Committee, which is part of the Organization of the
IsIamic Conference (OIC). This organization, made up of 57 states tries to protect the interests
of aIl Muslim countries and speak with one voice. The Committee, under the chairrnanship of
King Mohammed VI, meets periodicaIly to address the situation of the PaIestinian population
(lslamic Conference) . AIso, its participation in military operations during the Gulf War and in
international peacekeeping operations, makes it a key aIly in Africa and the Arab worId for the
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next decades . According to Ex-Secretary of State, William Cohen, Morocco, South Afríca and
Nigeria, as members of the African Crisis Response Initiative, could act multilaterally in
humanitarian operations and crisis, if the Initiative is revived, and their military forces are
trained in the respect of civil governments. These countries could act multilaterally when a
crisis arises, so the US would not have to intervene in those conflicts, unless it is in its interest
(Corey).
Economically, but since the 80s, the Maghreb countries have tried to modernize their
economies and have looked for foreign investment not only from European countries but from
the US as well. In Morocco, the US is the second-largest investor nation, with more than 90
American companies operating. In Tunisia, the US is the third-largest investor nation, and
Alger ia is the fifth most important Arab country that has economic relations with the US
(Indyk). It is also important, the Eizenstat Initiative or the US-North African Economic
Partnership, which was launched by Stuart Eizenstat (Undersecretary of State, during the
Clinton Administration) to improve the economic relationship among these three countries
(Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia), since only 4-7% of the trade in the region is done among them
(Entelis 7). The Initiative also has the objectives of advancing the private sector and making
structural economic reforms, in order to integrate the economies of the three countries. But the
final objective of all these improvements was really to create a stable region and more political
dialogue, especially between Morocco and Algeria (Eizenstat). However, the Initiative has not
had the expected results, because it does not involve political changes as well. Although the
bilateral economic relationships between the US and each of the three countries have improved
much, the regional economic integration has not taken place, due to the differences between
Morocco and Algeria over Western Sahara.
3. THE PROBLEMS OF THE MA GHRE B AND THE TRANSA TLANTIC
RELATIONSHIP
3.1. PROBLEMS IN THE MAGHREB
The problems of the Magreb and the Mediterranean in general have been c!assified as
Soft Security Issues ', referring to political , economic and social problems and Hard Security
l. Among them, immigration from the Maghreb is very important for Southern European
countries ; the dependence that Spain or Italy, among others, have on Algerian energy supplies;
what has been called "Cultural Security" which originated with the influence that Western
societies had in different Arab and Muslim countries through television programs, the Internet,
and other forms of communication; and because Maghrebi immigrants' customs and ways of
life are not always well -accepted by Western societies. <http://www.rand.org/publications/
MR/MR957/#contents>.
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Issuesi that affect the US and Europe. Considering that these are very complex issues and very
difficult to resolve, cooperation between the Atlantic institutions is paramount , because trying
to resolve sorne of these problems unilaterally, can be "costly" and can create "political
discomfort" that could be avoided with a joint policy and action between European and
Atlantic institutions (Larrabee 17).
Other problems in the Maghreb have been internal problems like the AIgerian cris is,
when in 1991 the Islamists won the elections and the results were cancelled. This event made
the neighboring countries fearful of the possible spread of the conflict to their territories, and
the European countries, especially the Southern European countries , were afraid of possible
waves of immigrants. AIso, the crisis was seen with concern from the European countries,
because in 1995 and 1996 sorne terrorist attacks took place in Paris, where a connection was
discovered between the Armed Islamic Group (an AIgerian terrorist group) and sorne European
nationals. The AIgerian situation was then a subject in the Transatlantic Agenda, and it
influenced the US view of NATO, because not only was NATO's expansion to the Eastern
European countries considered important, but the danger of the AIgerian crisis spreading to
other countries made members of NATO think about the role of the AlIiance in such situation.
On the other hand, AIgeria is an important producer of natural gas and oil, and countries like
France, Spain , and Italy have great dependence on these products . For them and the rest of
Europe, it is necessary that AIgeria remain stable, in order to avoid possible energy
interruptions (Lesser 12-20), waves of immigrants, and the spread ing of its instability to other
countries.
Another unresolved problem has been the disagreement between Morocco and AIgeria
over Western Sahara. The differences between Morocco and AIgeria over Western Sahara run
deep and are difficult to solve. In April 2002 , when Mohammed VI visited the US, he told
President Bush that his position on the Western Sahara was to give great autonomy to the
territory but not independence nor to permit a partitioning of it, because that could cause a
situation similar to the one in the Balkans and it could create instability in the region (Arabic
News Com, 2002). On the other hand, AIgeria is in favor of a referendum and its president,
Bouteflika, expressed his view of the problem to President Bush when he visited the US in
200 l . For AIgeria, the implications of this conflict have been important because there have been
about 155,000 refugees in AIgerian camps since 1976 (afrol Com, Western Sahara refugees. . .,
2001). However, the reasons why AIgeria supports the Polisario Front (a saharawi group that
led the opposition against Spain first and then Morocco when it occupied Western Sahara.
Today it acts as the government of Western Sahara) might be deeper: though during the 70s, the
AIgerian government supported anti-colonial revolutionary groups due to ideolog ical reasons ,
AIgeria also wants to prevent Morocco from dorninating the Northwest of Afric a, becau se
Morocco would have more political and territorial influence and that could cause a Moroccan
2. These would include the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD), drug trafficking, etc. <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR957/#
contents>.
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territorial claim to the western AIgerian territory. But if Western Sahara is independent, it could
be used as a buffer zone between Morocco and AIgeria (a way to contain Morocco, as AIgeria
sees it), as a way to gain access to the Atlantic for AIgeria, and for exploiting the mineral
resources of the area (Berke 6).
The problem of the Western Sahara needs to be addressed by the international
community, and the EU and the US need to cooperate to resolve it. One of the issues in this
confl ict has been the constant US support of Morocco, which has been criticized by analysts
like Stephen Zunes (a professor from the University of San Francisco) because it can have
undesirable consequences, since
"U.S. support for Morocco's invasion and occupation legitimizes territorial aggression,
which serves as a dangerous precedent. The ongoing occupation is a source of political
instability both in Morocco and in the region as a whole. The U.S. has supported an
autocratic government in Morocco and is proffering questionable economic priorities"
(2). 3
The EU's position on the problem has been influenced by France, which has oil
interests in the area. In fact, the French company TotalFinaElf and Morocco signed a contract
for oil exploration off the coast of Western Sahara in October 2001, which caused protests by
the Saharawi President, Mohammed Abdelaziz, who protested to the United Nations (UN)
about the signing of that illegal contract, since the territory does not belong tooMorocco
(afro.Com 2002). So far, France has sided with Morocco and has opposed a referendum. The
Spanish governrnent has declared that it is necessary that both parts (Morocco and the Polisario
Front) agree on a solution, because any imposed solution will not solve the problem.
Another problem in the region, and one that worries Washington more than Brussels,
though it can affect European countries more directly than it can the US, due to geographical
proximity, is the possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Cruise Missiles. It is
worrying for the US that a country like AIgeria could acquire these types of weapons, because
not only could they reach European capitals but they could also limit the freedom of movement
of US troops, due to possible attacks on military installations in Europe and other regions. For
European countries, the possession of these types of weapons also can be dangerous because
they could be threatened when they follow policies opposed to those countries' interests (Lesser
22-23).
Another problem has been the unpredictable Libyan regime, which helped terrorist
groups in the past and tried to acquire all kinds ofweapons. Nowadays, it seems that this regime
wants a closer and better relationship with the West, including the US, and to end its
international isolation. Although the sanctions imposed on the Libyan regime-due to the
Lockerbie attack in 1998-by the UN have disappeared, the US sanctions have not, but there
have been declarations by Gadaffi expressing his intention to resume relations with the US and
3. For a detailed explanation of the Western Sahara occupation, see: <www.foreignpolicy-
infocus.orglbriefs/voI3/v3n42mor_body.html >.
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the EU (CNN.com 2001) . Also, he condemned the terrorist attacks of September 11th and
expressed sympathy for the vict ims (Wikipedia). In any case, it cannot be forgotten that Libya
has chemical weapons and performs research on biological weapons, and other countries like
Iran and Iraq could buy and sell these types of weapons as well.
There is a conflict that affects the whole region, the Arab world , the US and the EU,
which is the Arab-Israeli conflict. HIt is impossible to ignore the links between the heaIth of the
Middle East peace process and the prospects for deepening security cooperation along
Mediterranean North-South lines" (Larrabee 6). This conflict has also created deep differences
between the US and the EU, because the US is more indulgent with the Israeli position , due to
domestic political pressures, and the EU is more critical of Israel and more prone to defend the
Palestinian position in the conflict, due to commercial reasons and geographical proximity
(Gompert 4-5).
3.2. PROBLEMS IN THE TRANSA TLANTIC RELATIONSHIP
The US and the EU have a common objective in the Mediterranean and the Maghreb,
and that is regional stability. However, to develop a common policy and course of action is
difficult, because they do not agree on the methods to use. Since the end of the Cold War, their
relationship has changed and problems that were not so obvious before are more visible now.
During the Cold War, Europe had a tremendous depende ncy on the US, especially in security
terms, and both had the objective of containing the Soviet Union. Once the Soviet Union
disa ppeare d, the mutual objective also disappeared, and though there still are common
objectives like the promotion of democracy, justice, and human rights, differences in opinions
and ways of proceeding when a conflict arises are more obvious now than before, regarding the
Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, Libya, terrorism, etc.
Another problem has been the different meanings that the Mediterranean region has
for the EU and for the US, though this is chang ing. When European countries, especially
southem European countries, think about the Mediterranean, they think about the Maghreb ,
because it is closer to them and what happens there has an impact on these countries . When the
US thinks about the Mediterranean, it thinks about Greece , Turkey, the Black Sea, Israel and
the neighboring countries .
These differences, together with the absence of a common transatlantic policy to
resolve crises in this region, resulted in the creation of different initiatives to address the
Mediterranean, such as the Barcelona Conference in 1995 (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) , in
which the US did not participate, and the launching ofNATO's Mediterranean Dialogue.
4. APPROA CHES TO THE MAGHREB
There have been several initiatives approaching Mediterranean issues , like the
Westem European Union Dialogue of 1992, created to exchange views of the secur ity and
defense, and Mediterranean issues between Israel , Jordan, Egypt, AIgeria, Mauritania,
Morocco , Tunisia and Westem European Union members. Another initiative has been the
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OSCE"s Mediterranean Dialogue, between AIgeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Israel, Egypt,
which started in 1994 as an informal meeting with OSCE 's members. The objective of the
initiative is the promotion of democracy and the rule of law, and see the "human side" of
security. (Lesser 39-40). For the Maghreb, two of these are very important: NATO's
Mediterranean Dialogue and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. NATO 's . Mediterranean
Dialogue was launched in 1994, based on the idea that security in Europe is linked to security in
the Mediterranean. The objectives of the Dialogue are to make the Mediterranean participants
(Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Mauritania, and AIgeria, which has been a member
since 2000) understand the defense polic ies, information, civil, and emergency planning of
NATO (NATO Handbook), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was launched in 1995 with
the Barcelona Declaration, with the objectives of establishing an area of peace and security,
create a free -trade area between the EU and the 12 Mediterranean participants (Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel , Jordan, The Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey,
Cyprus, Malta) and Libya as an observer, and promote the cultural understanding between both
sides ofthe Mediterranean and develop free civil societies (EU, External Relations 2002).
NATO 's Mediterranean Dialogue has been criticized because it was supposed to be a
dialogue, but it excluded Lebanon and Syria, so the main point of the initiative was missed by
not including all those countries. It was also criticized because by excluding those countries, it
created the idea of good and bad countries, the good ones being those included in the initiative
and the badlexcluded ones , and so giving NATO a "new enemy stereotype": Muslim and Arab
countries that do not conform to the rules of the West. As a result , sorne Southern European
countries (Italy, Spain, France and Portugal) have followed this new doctrine, and have even
created a Rapid Deployment Force (EUROFOR) and an associated mari time force
(EUROMARFOR) to respond to the possible threats from Southern Mediterranean countries
(Koechler 4-5). AIso, the Arab -Israeli conflict makes it difficult for participants to agree on
different issues and to build confidence among members. The fact that NATO is composed of
former colonial countries and the slow response to the suffering of Muslim populations during
the war in Bosnia and Kosovo creates little confidence on the part of the Southern
Mediterranean countries (Lesser 27-28).
The results of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are not as positive as expected, due
to the scarce progress in the Arab-I srael i conflict, the lack of desire on the European part to
open up its markets to the Mediterranean partners, and the unwillingness of Mediterranean
authoritarian governments to open up their political systems to more democratic ones
(Jünemann, 2002).
5. CONCLUSION
Since the Mediterranean is a complex region and the US and the EU want peace and
security for the area, cooperation between them will be essential. Due to geographical
proximit y, historical ties, and political and economic interests, the EU will necessarily need to
tackle most of the political, econom ic and social issues that affect the Maghreb. Security and
defense issues will need special participation by the USo Transatlantic cooperation will be
Transatlantie Relations and the Maghreb. 93
necessary to maintain the stability in the region through NATO. The US can support and
complement European political , economic and social policies , with economic agreements such
as the US-North African Economic Agreement (Einzestat Initiative) and also with programs
that improve and develop better social policies for the Maghreb population and democratic
principies, through agencies like The Peace Corps and USAID.
In order to provide security in the region, the EU will need to speak with one voice and
develop a true foreign policy and military capabilities. To do that, the EU will have to address
its military needs, and it will need clear and transparent communication with the US in order to
avoid bureaucratic and jurisdictional problems when a conflict arises . It will be necessary to
avoid the duplication of military capabilities, and consider the opinions of NATO member
countries which are not EU members when a conf1ictarises (Larrabee).
AIso, NATO will need to adapt to the new international environment. In the
Mediterranean, its roll will need to be subordinated to the EU, because most of the
Mediterranean problems are economic, poli tical and social. However, the different views of
NATO members make it difficult to agree on a common course of action (Lesser 43-45 t It will
be necessary to address the different views that the US and the EU have of the Mediterranean
and the rivalry between the US and France over NATO 's Southern Command will need to be
addressed (Koechler 6).
As it can be seen, stability more than democracy is the objective of the US and the EU
in the Maghreb due to a lack of confidence among about the possibility of Arab countries
becoming real democracies, because most of them suffer from nationalistic confl icts, poverty ,
population growth, lack of democratic traditions (Entelis 9). Howeve r, supporting democratic
governments, investments, information technology, human rights would mitigate problems
such as terrorism, WMD, poverty and violence, and Arab countries' internal situations would
improve (Gompert 3). The support of democratic institutions could help the image of the US in
the region, and the support of a common Transatlantic policy on the Maghreb could be an
exam ple for the region at a time when the differences between the US and the EU hare so
obvious in so many international issues.
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